Fix the energy market
Re-architect how energy is priced, procured, and coordinated across the grid.
Move the GB electricity market from periodic central optimisation and marginal pricing towards a continuously-coordinating, physics-aligned architecture (see the FP-AMM candidate solution in /challenge) — while keeping the lights on, prices fair, and the transition legally and politically deliverable.
Mission direction
Status quo
What exactly exists today — legally, institutionally, technically and operationally — that the desired system needs to change?
Law
Energy Act 2023 and predecessor legislation
The Electricity Act 1989 (as amended) remains the underlying legal basis for licensing generation, supply, transmission and distribution. The Energy Act 2023 created the National Energy System Operator (NESO) and gave DESNZ and Ofgem additional powers over strategic planning, but did not itself redesign wholesale market pricing or settlement.
Regulation
Ofgem licensing and price control
Generation, supply, transmission and distribution are separately licensed by Ofgem. Network companies operate under RIIO price controls. Wholesale trading itself is largely unregulated (bilateral contracts plus balancing), while settlement and imbalance pricing are governed by industry codes rather than direct licence conditions.
Institutions
NESO, Ofgem, DESNZ and the network companies
NESO operates the transmission system and runs balancing markets. Distribution Network Operators (DNOs) manage local networks. Ofgem regulates; DESNZ sets policy. Responsibility for market design change is split across all of them, with no single institution owning end-to-end market architecture.
Markets & mechanisms
Day-ahead/intraday trading plus balancing mechanism
Wholesale trading happens mostly bilaterally and on exchanges ahead of real time; NESO then balances the system in near-real-time through the Balancing Mechanism, settled half-hourly (moving towards more granular settlement). Pricing is marginal and largely uniform-national rather than reflecting local network conditions or continuous re-optimisation.
Funding
Network costs recovered through regulated charges
Network and balancing costs are recovered through regulated use-of-system charges on consumer bills, set through Ofgem price controls. There is no existing budget line for testing or transitioning to an alternative market architecture.
Technology
Legacy settlement and metering infrastructure
Settlement systems were built around half-hourly (increasingly moving to more granular) periodic clearing, not continuous or event-driven market coordination. Smart meter rollout gives more granular consumption data than a decade ago, but market systems have not been redesigned around that data.
Data
Fragmented, largely non-real-time data access
Market and network data is held across multiple parties (NESO, DNOs, Elexon, suppliers) with limited standardised, real-time, publicly accessible interfaces. Independent replication of market analysis is difficult without negotiated data access.
Operations
Manual, forecast-driven balancing
Day-to-day operation depends heavily on forecasting and corrective balancing actions rather than continuous, participant-driven coordination. Increasing shares of distributed generation and flexible demand are straining an architecture designed around a smaller number of large, predictable generators.
The change map
Every concrete change required to move from the status quo to the desired system, with who has authority, the legal mechanism, and current status.
RegulationResearchingOfgem licence/rule change enabling AMM-based settlement
Regulatory / market design · Licence modification
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Ofgem licence/rule change enabling AMM-based settlement
Regulatory / market design · Licence modification
Current state
Settlement and imbalance pricing operate under existing Balancing and Settlement Code (BSC) rules and supplier/generator licence conditions, built around periodic marginal clearing.
Desired state
A licence and/or code framework that permits continuous, AMM-based clearing and forward flexibility procurement to operate alongside (and eventually instead of) the existing mechanism.
Change required
Ofgem would need to run a case for change, consult, and either modify relevant licence conditions or approve a code modification route (see the linked BSC change item) to permit the new mechanism to operate, initially likely in a sandboxed or pilot form.
Authority / delivery
Pathway
Evidence required
Technical feasibility evidence, a regulatory impact assessment, and a consumer/distributional impact analysis.
Funding required
Regulatory and legal pathway analysis (indicative estimate, not yet costed).
Owner: Enleashed / mission lead
InstitutionsNot startedBalancing and Settlement Code modification for continuous clearing
Industry code · Industry code modification
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Balancing and Settlement Code modification for continuous clearing
Industry code · Industry code modification
Current state
The BSC defines half-hourly (moving towards more granular) settlement, administered by Elexon under BSC Panel governance.
Desired state
A BSC modification (or equivalent successor code) that accommodates continuous, event-driven clearing rather than only fixed-period settlement.
Change required
Raise a formal modification proposal, work it through an Elexon workgroup and impact assessment, and secure a BSC Panel/Ofgem decision.
Authority / delivery
Pathway
Depends on
Evidence required
Working technical demonstration of continuous clearing compatible with existing settlement obligations.
Funding required
Not yet costed.
InstitutionsResearchingNESO operational responsibility for forward flexibility procurement
Institutional · Institutional decision
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NESO operational responsibility for forward flexibility procurement
Institutional · Institutional decision
Current state
NESO procures balancing and some flexibility services through existing balancing-mechanism and ancillary-service routes.
Desired state
NESO (or a successor operational function) directly procures forward flexibility through the AMM mechanism as a core operational responsibility.
Change required
NESO leadership would need to scope, trial and formally adopt the new procurement route as part of its operational remit.
Authority / delivery
Pathway
Evidence required
Pilot results demonstrating operational reliability.
Funding required
Not yet costed.
PolicyBuilding supportDESNZ policy support for an AMM-based market design pathway
Government policy · Other
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DESNZ policy support for an AMM-based market design pathway
Government policy · Other
Current state
DESNZ's market reform work (e.g. Review of Electricity Market Arrangements) has considered zonal/nodal pricing reforms but has not evaluated an AMM-based architecture as a distinct option.
Desired state
DESNZ treats an AMM-based architecture as a credible option within its market reform programme, backed by evidence.
Change required
Brief the DESNZ market reform team, submit evidence to relevant consultations, and build a credible case alongside the regulatory and technical workstreams.
Authority / delivery
Pathway
Evidence required
Independent technical and economic evidence; comparison against other reform options under consideration.
Funding required
Not yet costed.
LawNot startedConfirm whether primary legislation is required
Legislative (conditional) · Legislation
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Confirm whether primary legislation is required
Legislative (conditional) · Legislation
Current state
It is not yet established whether the Electricity Act 1989 and Energy Act 2023 already provide sufficient legal basis for this change via licence/code modification, or whether new primary legislation would be needed.
Desired state
A clear legal opinion on the minimum legislative pathway required, so effort isn't wasted pursuing a legislative route if a regulatory one would suffice (or vice versa).
Change required
Commission a legal feasibility review comparing the licence-modification route against a legislative route.
Authority / delivery
Pathway
Evidence required
Legal feasibility analysis.
Funding required
Legal and regulatory pathway analysis (indicative estimate, not yet costed).
TechnologyNot startedIndependent AMM pilot on a live network segment
Technical · Procurement
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Independent AMM pilot on a live network segment
Technical · Procurement
Current state
The AMM mechanism has been modelled and simulated (see /challenge candidate solutions and evidence) but not yet operated against a live network segment.
Desired state
A working pilot, run with a willing network operator or supplier, operating the AMM mechanism against real (or shadow) load and generation.
Change required
Secure a pilot partner (e.g. via an innovation-funding route such as Ofgem's Strategic Innovation Fund), build the pilot infrastructure, and run it under appropriate regulatory sandbox arrangements.
Authority / delivery
Pathway
Evidence required
Pilot results; safety and reliability evidence.
Funding required
Pilot build and operation (indicative estimate, not yet costed).
Who can act?
Decision makers, delivery bodies, influencers, beneficiaries, potential opponents, experts, the public and funders — transparent democratic advocacy, not tactics.
Decision maker (3)
Ofgem
Regulator · Office of Gas and Electricity Markets
Unknown
Ofgem
Regulator · Office of Gas and Electricity Markets
Formal power
Sets and modifies licence conditions; approves code modifications; runs price controls.
Informal influence
Regulatory signalling shapes what industry treats as viable to invest in.
Interests
Consumer protection, system reliability, value for money, net zero delivery.
Concerns
Untested mechanisms creating consumer or system risk; process legitimacy.
DESNZ
Government department · Department for Energy Security and Net Zero
Unknown
DESNZ
Government department · Department for Energy Security and Net Zero
Formal power
Sets energy policy; can bring forward legislation; funds innovation programmes.
Informal influence
Ministerial attention strongly shapes Ofgem and NESO's prioritisation.
Interests
Bill affordability, energy security, net zero delivery, political deliverability.
Concerns
Delivery risk during an already-complex market reform programme (REMA).
Parliament
Legislature
Unknown
Parliament
Legislature
Formal power
Only body that can pass primary legislation, if a legislative route turns out to be required.
Informal influence
Select committee scrutiny can put pressure on Ofgem/DESNZ even without new law.
Interests
Constituent bill impact, energy security, net zero commitments.
Concerns
Legislative time is scarce; this would need a strong, evidenced case.
Delivery body (3)
NESO
System operator · National Energy System Operator
Unknown
NESO
System operator · National Energy System Operator
Formal power
Operates the transmission system and balancing mechanism; a required delivery partner for any live pilot.
Informal influence
Technical credibility with Ofgem and DESNZ on operability questions.
Interests
System reliability, operability, a manageable transition path.
Concerns
Operational risk from running two mechanisms in parallel during transition.
Elexon / BSC Panel
Code administrator · Elexon
Unknown
Elexon / BSC Panel
Code administrator · Elexon
Formal power
Administers the BSC modification process; the Panel recommends modification decisions.
Informal influence
Sets the practical pace at which any code-based change can move.
Interests
Settlement integrity, industry-wide workability.
Concerns
Implementation complexity and cost for all BSC parties, not only this mission.
Distribution Network Operators
Delivery / potential pilot partner
Unknown
Distribution Network Operators
Delivery / potential pilot partner
Formal power
Control access to the network segments any pilot would need to run on.
Informal influence
Practical gatekeepers for real-world trial credibility.
Interests
Network reliability, an evidence base for their own investment planning.
Concerns
Operational and reputational risk from an unproven mechanism.
Beneficiary (1)
Households and businesses
Consumers
Unknown
Households and businesses
Consumers
Formal power
No direct formal power over market design decisions.
Informal influence
Collective consumer sentiment shapes political pressure on ministers and Ofgem.
Interests
Lower, fairer bills; reliable supply.
Concerns
Complexity or risk that ends up passed through to bills.
Potential opponent (1)
Incumbent suppliers and generators
Market participants
Unknown
Incumbent suppliers and generators
Market participants
Formal power
No formal veto, but participate in code modification workgroups and consultations.
Informal influence
Substantial lobbying capacity and existing relationships with Ofgem/DESNZ.
Interests
Revenue predictability, manageable transition and compliance cost.
Concerns
Stranded investment under existing market rules; competitive exposure under a new mechanism.
Expert (1)
Independent academic and technical experts
Expert reviewers
Open
Independent academic and technical experts
Expert reviewers
Formal power
No formal decision power, but credibility with regulators depends on independent validation.
Informal influence
Peer review and replication materially affects how seriously Ofgem/DESNZ take the evidence.
Interests
Methodological rigour, publishable research questions.
Concerns
Evidence needs to be genuinely independently reproducible, not just self-published.
Funder (1)
Innovation and philanthropic funders
Funders
Unknown
Innovation and philanthropic funders
Funders
Formal power
Control access to grant and innovation funding routes (e.g. Ofgem SIF, research councils, philanthropy).
Informal influence
Funding decisions signal credibility to other stakeholders.
Interests
Public-interest impact, well-evidenced proposals.
Concerns
Delivery capability and governance of the recipient organisation.
Pathways to change
Not every change happens the same way. These are the generic routes this mission's changes can take — highlighted where a change item actually uses them.
Legislative
In useChange requires new primary or secondary legislation from Parliament.
Drafting → Parliament → Bill → Act → Implementation
Regulatory
In useChange requires a regulator (e.g. Ofgem) to run a decision or licence-modification process.
Case for change → Regulator consultation → Decision → Licence / rule change → Implementation
Industry code
In useChange is delivered through an industry code's own governance process (e.g. BSC, CUSC, Grid Code).
Modification proposal → Workgroup → Impact assessment → Panel / authority decision → Implementation
Government policy
In useChange requires a government department to adopt a policy position and commit to it.
Evidence → Department engagement → Ministerial support → Policy decision
Institutional
In useChange is a decision an institution (e.g. NESO, a network operator) can make about its own responsibilities or operations.
Proposal → Board / leadership decision → Organisational reform
Procurement
In useChange is delivered by specifying and procuring a system, service or pilot.
Specification → Funding → Procurement → Deployment
Voluntary market adoption
Change spreads through the market without a mandate — early adopters demonstrate it, then it scales.
Demonstration → Early adopters → Scaling
Technology
In useChange depends on building and proving working software or infrastructure first.
Research → Prototype → Pilot → Production → Integration
Public / political
Change depends on public understanding and political will, not only technical or regulatory steps.
Evidence → Communication → Coalition → Public support → Political commitment
Funding
Change is blocked on securing the money to do the work, not on a decision or a mechanism.
Case → Funder → Commitment → Deployment
Change agents
What forces could actually make this change happen?
Economic necessity
The cost of the status quo becomes too high to justify inaction.
Academic evidence
Peer-reviewed or independently validated research shifts the debate.
Technical demonstration
A working prototype or pilot proves the idea is real.
Regulator leadership
The regulator's own leadership decides to prioritise this.
Consultations
A formal consultation creates the structured route to a decision.
Funding
Money becomes available to do the work that unblocks everything else.
Coalition / buy-in
What legitimate concerns must be resolved to build a coalition capable of delivering change?
—
—
Independent academic and technical experts
Evidence needs to be genuinely independently reproducible, not just self-published.
Ofgem
Untested mechanisms creating consumer or system risk; process legitimacy.
DESNZ
Delivery risk during an already-complex market reform programme (REMA).
Parliament
Legislative time is scarce; this would need a strong, evidenced case.
NESO
Operational risk from running two mechanisms in parallel during transition.
Elexon / BSC Panel
Implementation complexity and cost for all BSC parties, not only this mission.
Distribution Network Operators
Operational and reputational risk from an unproven mechanism.
Households and businesses
Complexity or risk that ends up passed through to bills.
Incumbent suppliers and generators
Stranded investment under existing market rules; competitive exposure under a new mechanism.
Innovation and philanthropic funders
Delivery capability and governance of the recipient organisation.
—
—
Evidence needed for change
Different decision makers require different evidence. Connects back to the Challenge investigation's evidence where it already exists.
Independent replication of the AMM simulation
Academic validation · supports "Independent AMM pilot on a live network segment"
Required by: Ofgem, academic reviewers
How we get it: Commission or partner with an independent academic group to reproduce the published results.
Consumer and distributional impact analysis
Consumer impact · supports "Ofgem licence/rule change enabling AMM-based settlement"
Required by: Ofgem, DESNZ
How we get it: Commission economic modelling of bill impact across household types.
Legal feasibility of the licence-modification route
Legal feasibility · supports "Confirm whether primary legislation is required"
Required by: Ofgem legal, DESNZ
How we get it: Commission external legal opinion comparing licence-modification and legislative routes.
Cybersecurity assessment of real-time settlement infrastructure
Cybersecurity · supports "Independent AMM pilot on a live network segment"
Required by: NESO, Ofgem
How we get it: Independent security review ahead of any live pilot.
International precedent review (PJM, Australia NEM, GB alternatives)
International precedent
Required by: DESNZ, general credibility
How we get it: Already covered in the /challenge candidate-solution comparison (GB, Zonal, PJM, Australia, FP-AMM).
Fund the mission
Funding as a first-class delivery workstream — required, secured and the gap, by workstream.
Required
£550,000
Secured
£0
Gap
£550,000
Independent replication & peer review
Research funding
Indicative estimate — not yet independently costed.
£50,000
£0 secured
Legal and regulatory pathway analysis
Philanthropy
Indicative estimate — not yet independently costed.
£50,000
£0 secured
SIF discovery-phase project
Innovation funding
Indicative estimate modelled on published Ofgem Strategic Innovation Fund discovery-phase grant sizes — not a submitted bid.
£150,000
£0 secured
AMM pilot build and operation
Innovation funding
Indicative estimate, likely route: Ofgem Strategic Innovation Fund or equivalent, following a successful discovery phase.
£250,000
£0 secured
Public explainers and communications
Community funding
Indicative estimate — not yet independently costed.
£20,000
£0 secured
Coalition and stakeholder engagement capacity
Philanthropy
Indicative estimate — not yet independently costed.
£30,000
£0 secured
Campaign / communication
Public understanding and political support this mission needs, and what each piece of communication is trying to achieve.
Explainer
Why the GB electricity market needs an AMM
Give a non-technical audience a clear, honest explanation of the problem and the proposed direction.
Consultation response · supports "Ofgem licence/rule change enabling AMM-based settlement"
Response to the relevant Ofgem/DESNZ market reform consultation
Put the evidence and proposed pathway formally on the regulatory record.
Parliamentary engagement · supports "DESNZ policy support for an AMM-based market design pathway"
Briefing for the relevant select committee
Build parliamentary awareness and scrutiny pressure alongside the regulatory and policy workstreams.
Build
Technology is one delivery workstream among many — shown here only where it's required to deliver the agreed solution.
TechnologyNot startedIndependent AMM pilot on a live network segment
Technical · Procurement
+
Independent AMM pilot on a live network segment
Technical · Procurement
Current state
The AMM mechanism has been modelled and simulated (see /challenge candidate solutions and evidence) but not yet operated against a live network segment.
Desired state
A working pilot, run with a willing network operator or supplier, operating the AMM mechanism against real (or shadow) load and generation.
Change required
Secure a pilot partner (e.g. via an innovation-funding route such as Ofgem's Strategic Innovation Fund), build the pilot infrastructure, and run it under appropriate regulatory sandbox arrangements.
Authority / delivery
Pathway
Evidence required
Pilot results; safety and reliability evidence.
Funding required
Pilot build and operation (indicative estimate, not yet costed).
Technical milestones
- Pilot partner secured — enables "Independent AMM pilot on a live network segment"Not started
- Prototype operational — enables "Independent AMM pilot on a live network segment"In progress
Roadmap
Milestones from every workstream, together — not a generic month-by-month calendar.
- ✓Desired outcomes agreed
- ○DESNZ policy engagement
- ○Legislative pathway identified
- ○Ofgem engagement
- ○Regulatory impact assessment
- ○Consultation launched
- ○Regulatory approval
- ✓Candidate architecture published
- ✓Academic evidence published
- ○Independent replication
- ○Pilot funded
- ○Pilot partner secured
- ◐Prototype operational
- ○National implementation— needs Regulatory approval, Pilot funded, Prototype operational, Legislative pathway identified
- ○Outcome verification— needs National implementation
Blockers / risks
What could stop this?
Incumbent opposition to redesigned settlement
OpenSuppliers and generators with revenue certainty under the current mechanism may lobby against change.
Mitigation: Engage incumbents early; design a transition path that limits sudden exposure; use independent evidence to keep the debate on substance.
Insufficient independent evidence to satisfy the regulator
OpenSelf-published simulation results may not be treated as sufficient by Ofgem.
Mitigation: Prioritise securing independent replication before seeking formal regulatory engagement.
Funding gap stalls the pilot
OpenWithout secured funding, the pilot (and the evidence it would produce) cannot proceed.
Mitigation: Pursue multiple funding routes in parallel (innovation funding, philanthropy, industry partners).
Cybersecurity or resilience concerns block regulatory approval
OpenReal-time settlement infrastructure is a plausible target for scrutiny on security grounds.
Mitigation: Commission an independent security review ahead of seeking approval, not after.
Political attention shifts away from market reform
OpenDESNZ's REMA programme and ministerial priorities can change; this mission depends partly on that attention continuing.
Mitigation: Keep the case grounded in economic necessity and evidence, not dependent on any one political moment.
Next actions
What actually needs to happen next.
Secure a network operator for an SIF discovery-phase pilot
Owner: unassigned · related to "Independent AMM pilot on a live network segment"
Produce an Ofgem regulatory-pathway analysis
Owner: unassigned · related to "Ofgem licence/rule change enabling AMM-based settlement"
Meet the DESNZ market reform team
Owner: unassigned · related to "DESNZ policy support for an AMM-based market design pathway"
Secure independent replication of the AMM simulation
Owner: unassigned
Raise £50k for legal and regulatory pathway analysis
Owner: unassigned · related to "Confirm whether primary legislation is required"
Complete an independent AMM simulation covering GB-scale operation
Owner: unassigned · related to "Independent AMM pilot on a live network segment"
How can I help?
Enleashed is collaborative — concrete ways to get involved with this mission.
I can provide expertise
Technical, legal, regulatory, economic or delivery expertise relevant to this mission.
I work in one of these institutions
You work inside a decision-maker, delivery body or influencer named on this page.
I can fund this
Grants, philanthropy, innovation funding or commercial investment.
I can test the technology
Pilot partner, network operator, supplier or platform to trial the build on.
I can provide data
Real-world data that would sharpen the evidence base or the pilot.
I can introduce a decision maker
A warm introduction to someone with formal power over one of the changes below.
I can help campaign
Communications, public campaigning or coalition-building capacity.
I can provide legal expertise
Help assess the legal or regulatory feasibility of a proposed mechanism.
I can challenge the evidence
Stress-test the problem, the evidence or the proposed solution.
I can help build it
Software, data or infrastructure delivery capacity.
Explain · Convene
Conversations & outreach
Public conversations that explain this mission's thinking and expose it to criticism and collaboration. This supports delivery — it isn't evidence that the underlying solution works.
A Fair, Flexible, Zero-Waste Digital Electricity Market
EnergyOS
This conversation explores the thinking behind a fundamentally different electricity-market architecture: one designed around digital infrastructure, distributed assets, network constraints and fairness, rather than continually adding new mechanisms around a legacy market. The discussion connects Shaun Sweeney's PhD research with the wider Enleashed mission to ask a more fundamental question: if we were designing an electricity market today using modern computing, communications and control technology, would we design anything resembling the market we currently have?
Entrepreneurship 101: From Industry to Research-Led Entrepreneurship
Universal Podcast Network
Why would someone leave industry and return to academia to solve a problem? This conversation explores the path from working inside the energy sector to stepping outside its existing assumptions, undertaking a PhD and eventually founding Enleashed as a research-led initiative. It considers the tension between entrepreneurship and academic research, the role of first-principles thinking in tackling systemic problems, and how research can be turned into candidate solutions capable of being tested and ultimately deployed. The second half of the conversation focuses on electricity-market reform: why electricity-market architecture matters to ordinary households, how fairness can become a formal engineering and market-design objective, and what a fundamentally different relationship between households and the electricity system could look like.